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Background: Many countries across the globe have released their own COVID-19 contact tracing apps. This has resulted in
the proliferation of several apps that used a variety of technologies. With the absence of a standardized approach used by the
authorities, policy makers, and developers, many of these apps were unique. Therefore, they varied by function and the underlying
technology used for contact tracing and infection reporting.
Objective: The goal of this study was to analyze most of the COVID-19 contact tracing apps in use today. Beyond investigating
the privacy features, design, and implications of these apps, this research examined the underlying technologies used in contact
tracing apps. It also attempted to provide some insights into their level of penetration and to gauge their public reception. This
research also investigated the data collection, reporting, retention, and destruction procedures used by each of the apps under
review.
Methods: This research study evaluated 13 apps corresponding to 10 countries based on the underlying technology used. The
inclusion criteria ensured that most COVID-19-declared epicenters (ie, countries) were included in the sample, such as Italy. The
evaluated apps also included countries that did relatively well in controlling the outbreak of COVID-19, such as Singapore.
Informational and unofficial contact tracing apps were excluded from this study. A total of 30,000 reviews corresponding to the
13 apps were scraped from app store webpages and analyzed.
Results: This study identified seven distinct technologies used by COVID-19 tracing apps and 13 distinct apps. The United
States was reported to have released the most contact tracing apps, followed by Italy. Bluetooth was the most frequently used
underlying technology, employed by seven apps, whereas three apps used GPS. The Norwegian, Singaporean, Georgian, and
New Zealand apps were among those that collected the most personal information from users, whereas some apps, such as the
Swiss app and the Italian (Immuni) app, did not collect any user information. The observed minimum amount of time implemented
for most of the apps with regard to data destruction was 14 days, while the Georgian app retained records for 3 years. No significant
battery drainage issue was reported for most of the apps. Interestingly, only about 2% of the reviewers expressed concerns about
their privacy across all apps. The number and frequency of technical issues reported on the Apple App Store were significantly
more than those reported on Google Play; the highest was with the New Zealand app, with 27% of the reviewers reporting technical
difficulties (ie, 10% out of 27% scraped reviews reported that the app did not work). The Norwegian, Swiss, and US (PathCheck)
apps had the least reported technical issues, sitting at just below 10%. In terms of usability, many apps, such as those from
Singapore, Australia, and Switzerland, did not provide the users with an option to sign out from their apps.
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Conclusions: This article highlighted the fact that COVID-19 contact tracing apps are still facing many obstacles toward their
widespread and public acceptance. The main challenges are related to the technical, usability, and privacy issues or to the
requirements reported by some users.
(J Med Internet Res 2021;23(2):e23467) doi: 10.2196/23467
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Introduction
Overview
The COVID-19 pandemic, the virus of which causes a highly
contagious respiratory infection, has spread rapidly across the
world and surpassed 20 million cases by early August 2020 [1].
The economic impact of the pandemic is felt globally with many
countries slipping into recession. The COVID-19 pandemic is
also turning into a job crisis, which is threatening to dismantle
several industries, from aviation and manufacturing to services,
tourism, and agriculture [2].
The global public health and government responses to the
pandemic have been fragmented due to the urgency of actions
required as a result of the stochastic spread of the virus. Some
countries are implementing policies to eradicate the virus, such
as Vietnam and New Zealand [3]; some countries are trying to
suppress and contain the spread of the virus, such as Australia
[4]; and some countries are relying on building herd immunity,
such as Sweden [5]. Nonetheless, the virus continues to spread
arbitrarily between regions and countries, and the epicenter of
the pandemic has been moving between continents. It started
with China and moved to Italy, Spain, the United States, and
Brazil, with India as the next in line. Several other countries
are now experiencing a second wave after initially suppressing
it, with clusters of new cases popping up in many countries [6].
The speed of the authorities’ response has also proven to be a
major key in containing the spread of the virus. For instance,
many experts weighed in on the relatively slow response of
Italy to contain the virus [7] and the fast response of South
Korea in suppressing it [8]. Despite the variations in the
worldwide governmental crisis responses to the pandemic and
the lack of clear and uniform advice on matters as simple as the
role of a mask in containing the spread of the virus [9], the
measures and policies used worldwide to contain the virus
remained mostly precautionary in the absence of a vaccine or
a treatment. Consequently, the direct safety advice as a result
of the COVID-19 pandemic continues to be about maintaining
good hand hygiene, practicing social distancing between people,
testing as soon as virus symptoms appear, quarantining, and,
importantly, contact tracing.
Contact tracing is the process of identifying, assessing, and
managing people who have been exposed to a disease to prevent
onward transmission [10]. Until a COVID-19 vaccine is
commercially available to the public, contact tracing tools are
vital in breaking the chains of transmission of the virus. This
means identifying infected people and their close contacts,
testing them, and isolating them for 14 days from day zero of
the exposure. For countries that managed to control the
exponential growth of the virus, known as flattening the curve,
extensive contact tracing was essential in minimizing large-scale
community transmissions. With countries recently coming out
of lockdown and opening their economies and borders again,
such as France and the United States, contact tracing is the key
to rapidly identifying new cases; hence, maintaining low levels
of community transmissions to remain successful in containing
the outbreak of the virus. Thus, in addition to comprehensive
testing capacity, contact tracing is increasingly becoming
important in managing this pandemic until a vaccine or a reliable
viral treatment is successful and made publicly available.
For contact tracing to be beneficial in preventing onward
transmission, and thereby reducing the impact of a second wave
of a contagious disease such as COVID-19, it should be
implemented systematically. This means having a system to
securely collect, compile, and analyze data about individuals
in real time, while not impinging on their privacy. As with the
lack of a uniform and standardized global response to the
pandemic, contact tracing technologies and approaches adopted
by several countries were also diverse. For instance, on the same
day in which Canada announced that they were working on a
new contact tracing app [11], the United Kingdom was
abandoning their contact tracing app, stating that the technology
does not work [12].
Background
Contact tracing using a mobile app relies on the concept of
proximity tracking. The concept behind contact tracing is to
identify and keep a record of people who may have been in
close proximity (eg, typically less than 1.5 meters) to other
people. Therefore, once an individual is identified to be infected
with COVID-19, the app will be used to retrieve and trace the
other close contacts. There have been various implementations
for contact tracing apps, and a range of technologies, security,
and privacy approaches have been adopted across the globe.
Notably, the effectiveness of these contact tracing technologies
remains to be seen. More evidence is required to demonstrate
whether these tools were successful in contact tracing and to
determine their usefulness.
Before the COVID-19 pandemic, a range of digital and mobile
health tools had been utilized for the purposes of infectious
disease control and public health interventions. Aba et al [13]
illustrated the variety of functionalities provided by mobile apps
to mitigate the spread of the Ebola virus in Africa, ranging from
contract tracing to surveillance to case management. Mobile
apps have also had a similar range of success in the use of public
health interventions mitigating the spread of tuberculosis in
Botswana [14].
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The current contact tracing apps for COVID-19, which have
been widely used by several countries, mostly use Bluetooth as
the underlying technology for proximity sensing. In an effort
to contribute toward having a unified solution for contact tracing
and to counter the limitations of using Bluetooth on the iOS
platform [15], Apple and Google have also recently released a
new framework to support contact tracing [16]. However, apps
that implement this framework have not matured enough yet.
Nonetheless, surveying the current apps in use; analyzing their
privacy features, penetration, and intake; and measuring their
reception by the public, including the ensuing issues faced, have
not been fully explored. This is demonstrated in a survey of the
prior literature, which is presented in Table S1 from Multimedia
Appendix 1. We briefly summarize a review of the main studies
from the literature below.
The user acceptability of contact tracing apps in five countries
hit by the pandemic using a survey were investigated in Altmann
et al [17]; however, the study did not review specific contact
tracing apps. Similarly, several studies [18-22] did not review
current COVID-19 apps through direct access of app stores. For
instance, the work reported in Anglemyer et al [18] did a
meta-analysis on medical databases to review contact tracing
apps. Others used various methodologies to conduct their
reviews.
Other works, such as the one reported in Collado-Borrell at al
[23], attempted to identify smartphone apps that aimed to
address the COVID-19 pandemic and analyzed their
characteristics. However, the study did not investigate any
specific app. It only classified the apps under specific categories,
such as health, fitness, or medicine. The main security and data
protection aspects relating to digital contact tracing frameworks
and apps were also investigated in Martin at al [24]; the paper
analyzed some of the privacy aspects, such as personal
information access, data retention, and location tracking. The
paper also highlighted some of the app’s public penetration;
however, the study was only limited to apps from Google Play.
An overview of mobile apps being currently used for COVID-19
and their assessment using the Mobile Application Rating Scale
was reported in Davalbhakta et al [25]. This study was limited
only to India, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Other
works, such as the one reported in Vaudena [26], studied
Bluetooth-based contact tracing solutions, including
Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing (DP-3T)
and Temporary Contact Numbers (TCN) protocols, from a
centralized versus decentralized point of view. As such, the
vulnerabilities and the advantages of both solutions were
systematically reviewed. The work focused more on the
underlying architecture used and the level of privacy protection
each one presented; however, it did not review specific
implementations of COVID-19 apps. Only a few apps were
used to represent the centralized and decentralized approaches.
The work in Magklaras and Bojorquez [22] surveyed the data
regulations and technology protocols relating to COVID-19
contact tracing apps. It also provided mapping for the global
deployment of the COVID-19 contact tracing apps. The paper
also discussed the challenges, including some privacy aspects,
relating to Bluetooth-based contact tracking technologies. The
work reported in Li and Guo [27] provided an in-depth review
of COVID-19 tracing app technologies and processes, including
app installation and registrations, encounter data processing and
communication, and notifications. The paper also analyzed the
security aspects of contact tracing app architectures (ie,
centralized, decentralized, and hybrid) by assessing their risk
against common security attacks, such as denial of service and
carryover attacks. This paper as well as an additional review
paper [28] discussed some users’ common concerns, but it did
not qualitatively analyze any users’ reviews.
Study Aims
To this end, the work presented in this paper reviews and
evaluates most categories of COVID-19 contact tracing mobile
apps in use today. To our knowledge, this is the first research
study that primarily investigated the public’s and users’
perceptions of COVID-19 contact tracing apps. This study also
aimed at studying the privacy feature implementations and the
level of penetration these apps achieved. In extension to the
first aim, we aimed to determine the outreach of the collated
apps in terms of number of downloads, as reported not only by
the app stores but also by the authorities of each of the apps’
corresponding countries. This is in addition to providing a
quantitative overview of the common complaints suggested by
app users in connection to privacy, battery drainage, technical
difficulties, bugs, crashes, and more. Additionally, in relation
to the second aim, the underlying apps’ architecture and
associated aspects, such as how the communication or handshake
between two devices in proximity took place and then how close
contacts were reported, were also analyzed. We also investigated
the timeline of when these apps were introduced. Lastly,
extending from the third aim, we attempted to understand the
nature, type, and extent of data capture of the apps, such as
granularity of data that was captured (ie, location, identification,
and accomplices), duration of data retention, option to discard
and delete records, and whether opt-out options were provided
to the user without uninstalling the app.
Methods
Selection of Apps, User Intake, and Penetration
This study classified contact tracing apps based on the type of
technology used for contact tracing of infected masses. This
study identified six distinct technologies and an additional
category commonly used or incorporated into COVID-19 tracing
apps. These included Bluetooth, the DP-3T protocol, GPS,
Pan-European Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing (PEPP-PT),
the TCN protocol, Google and Apple, and other technologies,
mainly the use of Quick Response (QR) codes paired with a
digital diary. These technologies are outlined in Table S2 from
Multimedia Appendix 1.
The classification criteria considered the underlying technology
used by the apps rather than classifying the apps based on
geographical or other architectural features. This is because
most of the apps in use today use Bluetooth. Therefore,
classifying the apps based on the underlying technology ensures
that the research is capturing most contact tracing solutions in
use. For instance, contact tracing solutions used by Singapore,
Australia, and Malaysia use the same technology (ie, BlueTrace).
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As such, there is little benefit to the research from surveying
all three of these apps.
Therefore, the research evaluated 13 apps corresponding to 10
countries and covered all the contact tracing technologies
identified above. All apps were free to download. The inclusion
criteria also ensured that most of the COVID-19-declared
epicenters (ie, countries) were included in the sample, such as
Italy and the United States. The evaluated apps also included
countries that did relatively well in controlling the outbreak of
COVID-19, such as Singapore; countries that had a low daily
number of new infections (ie, Australia); and countries that had
a medium-level daily number of new infections (ie, Pakistan).
The Swiss app was included in this study, as Switzerland was
among the few countries that did not implement a lockdown.
Similarly, the Swedish app was also included, given Sweden’s
unique approach to building herd immunity to combat
COVID-19. Informational apps or unofficial contact tracing
apps were excluded from this study, except for South Korea’s
Corona 100m app, which uses GPS technology for contact
tracing. This app was included because Corona 100m was
among the first major contact tracing apps that launched across
the globe and because South Korea is one of the few countries
that managed to quickly suppress the transmission of the virus.
Figure 1 shows the apps that were included in this study.
Figure 1. The 13 apps corresponding to 10 countries included in this study. DP-3T: Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing; PEPP-PT:
Pan-European Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing; QR: Quick Response.
Table 1 details the architecture and approaches used by each of
these technologies; these are as follows:
1. Country: For each type of technology used, a sample of
countries that use this technology and their contact tracing
apps are provided. Where there is more than one app used
in a country, the name of the corresponding app is provided.
It is worth noting that this is not a comprehensive list. The
aim is to evaluate some of the countries for the purpose of
adding context to the data presented in the table rather than
creating an inventory of apps. The next section provides
more details on the selection and inclusion criteria of the
apps evaluated in this study.
2. Architecture: This criterion investigates whether or not the
technology used by the contact tracing app incorporates the
concept of uploading contact logs to a central reporting
server. The criteria used are centralized, semicentralized,
and decentralized. It has proven difficult to exclusively
classify the architecture of each of these technologies, as
implementations varied from one app to another. For
instance, some apps uploaded contact logs to a central
server, but the server did not have access to the uploaded
contact logs, nor was it responsible for any further contact
tracing processing, while others had access. As such, this
criterion should be read in conjunction with the other criteria
presented in Table 1, mainly the encounter handshake and
infection reporting criteria.
3. Encounter handshake: This refers to how two devices
coming into close contact perform a handshake (ie,
exchange identification data). Most of the technologies
surveyed exchanged some form of a temporary ID, while
others exchanged some form of a unique identifier that was
either encrypted or in plain text, which also depended on
the specific implementation of each of the apps.
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4. Infection reporting. This refers to how the contact log is
reported to the central server and the role of this server in
contact tracing. Most of the apps relied on the users to
upload the contact logs. Implementations varied as well
based on whether the health authorities had access to the
contact logs or not.
5. Privacy by design. As the name suggests, this criterion
explored whether the technology embedded any privacy
considerations into its design specifications.
To analyze the users’ intake of each of the 13 apps under review
and the penetration by these apps, this study extracted the
following data for each of the apps: the name and country where
the app was launched, the number of installs as per Google Play
and as reported by the local news in the home country of the
app, the penetration percentage as per Google Play installs and
as reported by local news sources, and the launch date of each
of the apps.
The number of installs were not only sourced from Google Play
but also from local news outlets from the home country of each
of the corresponding apps. The penetration percentages sourced
from Google Play and the ones extracted from local news
sources were calculated by dividing the total number of installs
by the total population of the home country.
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aDP-3T: Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing.
bPEPP-PT: Pan-European Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing.
cTCN: Temporary Contact Numbers.
dWhere there was more than one app used in a country, the name of the corresponding app is provided within parentheses.
Investigating the Privacy-by-Design Features and
Privacy Implementations of COVID-19 Contact
Tracing Apps
This study expands on previous work [29] that compared the
privacy aspects of the COVIDSafe app (Australia, Bluetooth)
and the COVID Tracer app (New Zealand, QR code). Each of
the selected apps was downloaded and evaluated thoroughly.
The study first identified the underlying technology used for
contact tracing by an app and the amount of personal
information each app collected (ie, personal information access).
To do that, the following scale was used: if an app was only
collecting the name, email, and phone number of the user, then
the scale was designated as low; if, in addition to this personal
information, the app collected the age of the user, then the scale
was designated as medium; and if an app collected the name,
email, phone number, age, and any additional information, such
as the address, ethnicity, or location via GPS of the user, then
this criterion was rated as high.
Additionally, the study analyzed the location features and
tracking capabilities for each of the apps. It investigated whether
an app was tracking the movement of individuals or not (ie,
location tracking). It also investigated whether the app under
review knew the identity of the people in close proximity to the
user or just their locations or IDs (ie, true identity vs temporary
ID, such as with the TCN protocol). The criterion tracking and
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identifying proxies combined the encounter handshake and
infection reporting features.
Furthermore, this study investigated the record-keeping time
frame of each app. This was achieved by researching the
duration that the contact logs were kept on the device or the
authority’s remote servers for each of the apps under review.
In terms of user control, this study examined two criteria: the
user’s right to forget and the geo-restrictions imposed on an
app. The first criterion considered whether or not users were
informed about the procedures to delete the records collected
by an app. The opting-out criterion explored whether the users
were able to sing in and out of the app under review. Lastly, for
each app under review, the study investigated whether an app
could be downloaded from anywhere or whether it was a home
or region geo-restricted app (ie, geo-restriction). We referred
to governments’ media releases, white papers, and developers’
announcements for the apps that were in testing phases or were
not available on the Apple App Store or Google Play.
Analyzing the Public Reception of COVID-19 Contact
Tracing Apps
We aimed to identify the audience uptake and users’ feedback
of the COVID-19 contact tracing apps under review. Data were
sourced by scraping the publicly available user reviews from
the Apple App Store and Google Play webpages for each of the
apps. Scraping is a process or tool used to extract data from a
website; in this case, reviews from Google and Apple stores.
Almost 30,000 reviews were scraped and analyzed in this study.
The user reviews of each of the corresponding apps were then
filtered and analyzed using a brute-force keyword search
methodology; this means extracting the user reviews that
contained a specific keyword used in the search. Table 2 lists
the keywords used in scraping the reviews. The methodology
used for analyzing these reviews also accounted for the
variations of each of the keywords, referred to as subkeywords.
For instance, the results of scraping and analyzing certain
subkeywords—doesn’t work, didn’t work, not working, Doesn’t
work, Didn’t work, and Not working—were all counted toward
the results of the main keyword Malfunctioning. In other words,
the results reported under the keyword Malfunctioning are a
concatenation of each of the individual results returned by its
list of subkeywords.
Table 2. The keywords used in this study.
SubkeywordsKeywords
drain; battery; Drain; BatteryDrainage
spy; spied; spyware; Spy; Spied; SpywareSpyware
doesn’t work; didn’t work; not working; Doesn’t work; Didn’t work; Not workingMalfunctioning
crash; freeze; Crash; FreezeCrashes
privacy issue; privacy concern; location concern; tracking me; track me; tracking us; Privacy issue; Privacy concern; Location
concern; Tracking me; Track me; Tracking us
Privacy concerns
useless; rubbish; garbage; Useless; Rubbish; GarbageIneffective
bug; buggy; Bug; BuggyBugs
can’t install; doesn’t install; couldn’t install; Can’t install; Doesn’t install; Couldn’t installInstallation issues
can’t download; couldn’t download; incompatible; Can’t download; Couldn’t download; IncompatibleIncompatible
Results
Selection of Apps, User Intake, and Penetration
In this section, we initially describe results on app penetration.
A challenging aspect of sourcing the data reported in Table 3
[30-40] was encountered when calculating the intake of the apps
under study. For instance, the number of downloads for an app
does not represent the true value of the actual intake.
Downloading an app does not necessarily mean the app is being
used. Users may simply download the app and never use it or
uninstall it. In addition, there were little data available on the
number of uninstalls for each of the surveyed apps. Regardless
of this limitation, the number of installations for an app was not
available on the Apple App Store. This has made the task of
calculating the uptake of an app even more complex.
Consequently, the research required access to a more precise
estimate of the installation values as compared to what Google
Play was showing. Therefore, apart from consulting Google
Play’s number of installs, the study referred to reliable news
sources to obtain the total number of registrations or downloads
for each of the apps under review. The news sources were
mainly from government or developer announcements, verifiable
local news sources, and published research (ie, white papers).
Some of the statistical information, such as the download intakes
and any data sourced from local news, was available as of early
July 2020. As such, there might be a slight variation in the
values presented in Table 3 as compared those at the time of
the archiving of this paper. Some apps were new, so this local
value was not readily available for those either. Another
challenge this research study ran into was the unavailability of
some of the apps on the Google Play Store. This is because they
were discontinued or because they were still in demo or beta
stages.
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Table 3. Penetration and intake of the 13 selected contact tracing apps.
No. of days of the app's
launch since patient zeroa, n
Penetration, %No. of installs, nAppCountry
Google Play
Storeb








20N/A1.95N/A1,000,000 [36]Corona 100mSouth Korea
1080.001N/A500N/ACoCarePakistan
913.9224.031,000,0006,130,000 [37]COVIDSafeAustralia
822.0711.88100,000573,000 [38]NZ COVID TracerNew Zealand
905.7818.48500,0001,600,000 [39]SwissCovidSwitzerland
50N/A2.51100,000100,000 [40]Stop CovidGeorgia
aThe first case in the country was reported on the Johns Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center portal [30].
bAll download values have been extracted from the app’s webpage on Google Play.
cN/A: not applicable; data for apps were unavailable because the app was new, in the case of local news, or because it was discontinued or was still in
demo or beta stages, in the case of the Google Play Store.
The results of this study show that South Korea was the first
country to use a mobile app for contact tracing during the
COVID-19 pandemic. The South Korean app, Corona 100m,
was only introduced after 20 days from the first detected case
of COVID-19 in South Korea. This was followed by Singapore,
Norway, and Georgia, which introduced their apps around 50
days since patient zero. The United States, Italy, and Pakistan
were slower, as they introduced their contact tracing app around
the 100-day mark. As reported by local news, the Singaporean
(36%) and Norwegian (26%) apps had the highest penetration
intake, followed by the Australian and Swiss apps, which had
around 20% penetration, and the New Zealand app, which
achieved around 11% penetration. Interestingly, the Italian and
US apps had the lowest penetration values. The penetration
intake of the apps on the Android platform, which was calculated
based on the Google Play–reported number of installs for each
of the apps, showed that all apps under review, except for the
Singaporean app, had very poor intake (<5%).
Furthermore, this research initially intended to calculate the
success rate of each of the apps in contact tracing reporting. It
also aimed to survey and compare the efficacy of the apps under
review. However, this was challenged by the lack of any reliable
relevant data available in relation to those aspects; thus, this
part of the review had to be excluded. Therefore, it is unclear
whether the early introduction of contact tracing apps has
contributed toward their rapid public adoption or whether these
apps have played a major role in the contact tracing efforts of
COVID-19. Perhaps these apps have played some part in raising
awareness among the public, as in the case of the Singaporean
and Australian apps, which had higher penetration intake values
and lower infection numbers comparatively. However, due to
insufficient data, no conclusive results can be made on the
correlation between the early introduction of a contact tracing
app, its higher penetration intake, and the case where low
number of COVID-19 transmissions were reported.
Investigating the Privacy-by-Design Features and
Privacy Implementations of COVID-19 Contact
Tracing Apps
In the subsequent sections in this paper, when referring to an
app, the following notation shall be used: app name (country
of origin, technology used for contact tracing).
Table S3 from Multimedia Appendix 1 reviews the privacy
features of the 13 apps evaluated in this study. Each of these
apps was downloaded and evaluated thoroughly as per the
criteria shown in Table S3 from Multimedia Appendix 1. The
research also referred to white papers and developers’
announcements for the apps that were in their testing phases or
were not available or accessible on the Apple App Store and/or
Google Play. The same methodology was followed for the apps
that were not available in English, such as Immuni (Italy, Google
and Apple application programming interface [API]) [41],
SM-COVID-19 (Italy, ReCoVer) [42], and Smittestopp
(Norway, Bluetooth and GPS) [43].
Nine of the apps were available for free on both the Apple App
Store and Google Play. Two apps—SM-COVID-19 (Italy,
Google and Apple) and CoCare (Pakistan, Bluetooth)
[44]—were only available on Google Play, while Stop Covid
(Georgia, PEPP-PT) [45] was only available on the Apple App
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Store. The Corona 100m app (South Korea, location) [46] was
not available on both stores. Smittestopp (Norway, Bluetooth
and GPS) was not available to download due to geo-restrictions.
The Australian COVIDSafe app required an Australian phone
number and a postcode to run.
Bluetooth was the most frequently used underlying technology,
employed by seven apps for digital contact tracing, whereas
three apps performed contact tracing through location (eg, GPS).
The apps using location as the underlying technology, namely
Corona 100m (South Korea, location) and PathCheck SafePlaces
(United States, location), tracked and recorded the locations
visited by the users. Although Corona 100m (South Korea,
location) was removed from Google Play, the app integrated
GPS history, data from nationwide surveillance cameras, and
credit card transactions. This has sparked privacy concerns, as
users of the Corona 100m app could see the date when a
COVID-19 patient was infected, along with his or her
nationality, gender, age, and the locations they visited.
The Norwegian, Singaporean, Georgian [45], and New Zealand
[47] apps were among the apps that collected the most personal
information from the users, while some other apps, such as the
Swiss app [48] and the Italian Immuni app, did not collect any
user information. Other apps ranged from simply collecting
users’ phone numbers to additionally collecting their names or
email addresses.
Data destruction was incorporated into most of the apps, which
automatically deleted the users’ records after 14 days, the
observed minimum amount of time implemented in most of the
apps. Some kept these records for 21 days (ie, Australia) and
others for 30 days (ie, Switzerland and India); the New Zealand
app kept them for 31 days, while the Georgian apps kept them
for 3 years, the longest of any app.
Three of the US apps—PathCheck (United States, location)
[49], NOVID (United States, Bluetooth radio waves and
ultrasound) [50], and Care19 (United States, GPS) [51]—did
not require users to sign up before using their app. On the other
hand, many apps, such as the Singaporean TraceTogether app
[52], the Australian COVIDSafe app [53], and the Swiss and
Indian apps, did not provide the users with an option to sign out
from their app. It is noteworthy to mention that the data
presented in Table S3 of Multimedia Appendix 1 are accurate
as of June 30, 2020.
Analyzing the Public Reception of COVID-19 Contact
Tracing Apps
Figure 2 shows the percent occurrence for each of the keywords
for each app. Figure 3 shows the average ratings of the reviews
for each keyword. For example, consider if a user left a review
for one of the apps saying, “the app keeps on crashing,” and
then gave it a rating of 2 stars. This review will then be counted
toward the average mentions of the keyword crashes shown in
Figure 2. The 2-star rating will also be counted toward the
corresponding keyword average rating shown in Figure 3. All
small values were rounded up to 0.001.
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Figure 2. Percent occurrence of each keyword for each app. NA: not applicable; user reviews were unavailable, as the corresponding apps were not
available on the corresponding platforms.
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Figure 3. Average ratings out of 5 stars from user reviews in each category of each app on Google Play.
Three of the applications—CoCare (Pakistan, Bluetooth),
SM-COVID-19 (Italy, ReCoVer), and Corona 100m (South
Korea, location)—were not available on the Apple App Store,
whereas two apps—the Corona 100m (South Korea, location)
and Stop Covid (Georgia, PEPP-PT)—were not available on
Google Play. Based on the frequency of keyword occurrences,
Drain, Malfunctioning, and Ineffective were the most frequent
issues reported by the users in their reviews.
On the Apple App Store, the keyword rubbish had a 13.33%
occurrence for PathCheck SafePlaces (United States, location),
5.56% for NOVID (United States, Bluetooth), 5.40% for Immuni
(Italy, Google and Apple API), and 9.09% for NZ COVID
Tracer (New Zealand, digital diary). Similarly, many users did
not find contact tracing apps functional. On the Apple App
Store, many app users complained that their app did not work.
This was represented by the keyword Malfunctioning, which
had a 10.74% occurrence for NZ COVID Tracer (New Zealand,
digital diary), 6.50% for COVIDSafe (Australia, Bluetooth),
6.67% for TraceTogether (Singapore, Bluetooth), 7.80% for
Immuni (Italy, Google and Apple API), 11.11% for NOVID
(United States, Bluetooth), and a sharp 12.77% occurrence for
Care19 (United States, Apple and Google). Many users also
had problems with the apps’ compatibility with their operating
system and frequent crashes. For instance, CoCare (Pakistan,
Bluetooth) had a 16.67% occurrence for the incompatibility
issue.
Interestingly, and as shown in Figure 4, no significant battery
drainage issue had been reported for most of the reviewed apps.
The privacy concerns reported by the users were also very
minimal across all apps, as shown in Figure 5.
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Figure 4. Percent occurrence of the keyword "drainage," pertaining to battery drainage.
Figure 5. Percent occurrence of the keywords "privacy concerns" and "spyware".
Figures 6 and 7 provide overall insights into the technical issues
reported by the users for each of the apps. These figures combine
the results of the following keywords, along with their respective
subkeywords: Malfunctioning, Crashes, Ineffective, Bugs,
Installation issues, and Incompatible. It is obvious that most
apps on the Apple App Store had the most reported technical
issues when compared to their Google Play counterparts, except
for the Swiss contact tracing app. The US PathCheck app had
the least reported technical issues on Google Play, while the
New Zealand app version on the Apple App Store had the most
technical issues that were complained about across all apps and
platforms.
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Figure 6. Summary of technical issues reported for each of the apps. The plot shows results from the combination of the following keywords, along
with their respective subkeywords: "Malfunctioning," "Crashes," "Ineffective," "Bugs," "Installation issues," and "Incompatible".
Figure 7. Comparison of user app reviews and their inclusion of various keywords.
Discussion
Principal Findings
Our research study has highlighted the hindrances in the
successful deployment of COVID-19 contact tracing apps. The
use of mobile technologies for contact tracing has been met
with a number of challenges [54], many of which also emerged
in the contextual evaluation of user reviews on COVID-19
contact tracing apps as described in our study. Among these,
the most popular were technical malfunctions and drainage of
battery.
Other challenges included privacy. Of course, this is anticipated,
as you cannot expect to trace and track peoples’ movements by
a government authority without addressing privacy issues [55].
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Nonetheless, in addition to privacy, there were many other
challenges and limitations hindering the anticipated efficacy
from contact tracing apps.
For instance, a mobile contact tracing app needs to be widely
adopted by a population for it to be of benefit; this is challenging
to achieve. Penetration of COVID-19 contact tracing apps
remains low despite governments pushing for mass use [56].
The widespread adoption of contact tracing apps requires that
people would have access to a smartphone and, in most cases,
access to a reliable internet connection. Hence, in countries with
large populations, such as Pakistan [57], the smartphone
penetration percentage sits at only 15%, and in Indonesia this
value sits at only 31%. Users may also feel uncomfortable if
there is no clear opt-out strategy [58]. Nearly half of the apps
reviewed in our study did not provide a transparent withdrawal
avenue.
Furthermore, the approaches used by contact tracing apps rely
mostly on one single parameter (ie, proximity, such as via
Bluetooth) [59]. However, proximity by itself is not enough to
determine the risk of someone being exposed to the virus. There
are a number of other parameters involved, such as being indoors
or outdoors, being in a room with good air circulation or not,
and the issue of surface infection exposure, irrespective of the
proximity of an individual to an infected person. Furthermore,
although as shown in our review that Bluetooth was one of the
more popular technologies to implement contact tracing apps,
every country’s regulations may differ [60]; hence, a
one-size-fits-all approach may be problematic.
Other challenges pertain to the limitations associated with the
technology used for contact tracing. For instance, the use of
GPS as a proximity technology is not reliable in indoor
environments [61]. Determining the distance between two
persons using Bluetooth technology also has its own set of
challenges, such as signal strength attenuation caused by some
environmental factors (eg, if the phone is placed inside a thick
pocket or if the phone is at an angle facing a wall).
Nevertheless, contact tracing technologies surveyed in this work
have been found to use a locationless tracking approach; that
is, the app does not trace or record people’s movements,
obviously for privacy purposes. Therefore, most of these apps
can only determine if two people were in proximity at a given
time, but they do not keep a log of the users’ movements.
Consider, for example, if an infected person, labelled as Pi, is
in a supermarket and Pi touches an item at time t–1 at a location
designated as Li. Another person who is not infected, designated
as Pn, is at a location designated as Ln. There is no proximity
between Pi and Pn. Now assume Pi leaves the store at time t,
when at the same time (ie, at t) person Pn moves from Ln to Li.
There is a high chance that Pn is going to be infected if they
touch the same item Pi touched at t–1 (ie, surface infection
exposure). To be able to capture this exposure, contact tracing
apps require the use of a location-oriented tracking approach in
which the locations and movements of people are compared
against each other to determine the overlapped and colluded
locations. Future work will explore the use of our already
well-established location obfuscation technique [62] in a contact
tracing solution. The work will aim at providing a
location-oriented contact tracing app without impinging on
users’ privacy.
Limitations
One of the challenges encountered in scraping the reviews was
analyzing the apps that were not available in English. For
example, most of the reviews for the Immuni app (Italy, Google
and Apple), SM-COVID-19 (Italy, ReCoVer), and Smittestopp
(Norway, Bluetooth and GPS) were available in the Italian and
Norwegian languages, respectively. For these reviews, along
with the rest of the app reviews that were in different languages,
the keywords along with their subkeywords were translated into
the language of their home app country. The results were
incorporated when calculating the overall average values for
all the apps. The translated keywords along with the
subkeywords used can be found in Table S4 from Multimedia
Appendix 1. Another limitation in our methodology for review
scraping lies in the presence of false negatives in some of the
reviews. This is one of the limitations of brute-force keyword
search methodology. Take, for instance, one of the reviews for
COVIDSafe (Australia, Bluetooth) on Google Play:
Installed from its release. Worked. No problems at
all. It doesn't drain the battery. It doesn't crash. It's
totally fine. I haven't been dragged into the back of
a van, taken to an underground bunker and
questioned by spies.
The review is classified as a false negative for the words drain
and crash. It can be debated that the number of false negatives
could have been reduced by simply taking the battery
subkeyword out from the keyword search (ie, battery; drain).
However, in doing so, the number of 1-star reviews were
significantly reduced by more than 50%. For instance, with NZ
COVID Tracer (New Zealand, digital diary), the 1-star reviews
dropped from 23 to 10 after taking the word battery out of the
search filter. The reason behind this is that the users’ reviews
were not systematic. Most users represented their opinions in
natural language. Some samples of 1-star reviews for
COVIDSafe (Australia, Bluetooth) commenting on the app’s
drainage issue are as follows:
It is of no use whatsoever. A waste of money & a
waste of my battery life.
Battery went from 100% to zero in 5 hours with not
much use. I usually get a full day out of it.
Hard on the battery.
Therefore, for the sake of including these comments, the
subkeyword battery was not removed from the keyword search
results.
This study has a number of additional limitations. This paper
is based solely on 13 evaluated apps. While the selection criteria
ensured that apps were selected to represent each of the
categories of technology used for contact tracing, it did not
review all COVID-19 contact tracing apps. Also, the study relied
on data that were extracted and accurate as of July 2020.
Another major limitation of this work relates to the penetration
intake calculations done for each of the apps. The study derived
the percent penetration for each app by dividing the number of
installs of an app by the population of the home country. This
J Med Internet Res 2021 | vol. 23 | iss. 2 | e23467 | p. 13http://www.jmir.org/2021/2/e23467/
(page number not for citation purposes)
Elkhodr et alJOURNAL OF MEDICAL INTERNET RESEARCH
XSL•FO
RenderX
method suffers from several shortcomings. The number of
downloads or installs cannot be precise; it ignores the fact that
some users may install, uninstall, and reinstall the app several
times or on more than one device owned by the user. A user
may also download the app and never use it. Many users may
not download an app yet may still post a review about it. For
these reasons, the study attempted to gauge the penetration
intake for each of the apps by analyzing the local government
announcements and reports published by local news agencies.
However, since the reported download values cannot be verified
nor the methods used to derive them, the trustworthiness of
these values also remains invalidated. Lastly, although the study
evaluated about 30,000 user reviews, the reviews cannot not be
verified.
Conclusions
While public health agencies attempt to understand the efficacy
of nonpharmaceutical interventions [63], contact tracing has
been a key part of the worldwide measure in response to the
COVID-19 pandemic. For contact tracing to work effectively,
solutions such as tracing apps should be implemented
systematically. This requires the secure collection, processing,
storage, and discarding of contact tracing information of people
in real time, without impinging on their privacy and rights. The
success of contact tracing apps greatly depends on their large
uptake within a population, in addition to strong public health
enforcement. This article highlighted the fact that COVID-19
contact tracing apps are still facing many obstacles toward their
widespread and public acceptance.
The main challenges are related to the technical, usability, and
privacy issues or requirements reported by some users. This
meant that most tracing apps were not publicly well-received
and had low penetration levels, which hinders their
effectiveness. For instance, only the Singaporean app had a
penetration of slightly over 30%, the Australian and Swiss apps
achieved penetration just below 20%, and the penetration values
reported for most of the other apps were very poor, sitting at
below 5%. The amount of personal data collected by the apps
varied widely, with some apps not collecting data at all and
others collecting a significant amount of sensitive data about
the user, such as their ethnicity. The majority of the surveyed
apps did not provide the user with options to opt out from the
apps, such as logging out, without uninstalling them.
The lack of a standardized contact tracing approach also meant
that contact tracing apps used across the globe were fragmented
and noninteroperable. As most countries are now coming out
of lockdown and reopening their borders, there is an increased
need for a cohesive, cross-border, and interoperable contact
tracing app that can be used universally without impinging on
users’ privacy. Additionally, there is a lack of available data on
the effectiveness of COVID-19 contact tracing apps. As we
progressively recuperate from this pandemic, there is a need to
re-evaluate and re-examine the values and roles of contact
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